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Abstract
Kopeikin (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Rachels’ (1975) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition
that killing is no different than letting die. Hill’s (2018) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that
killing is worse than letting die. At least one of the intuitions must be mistaken. This calls for an error
theory. Hill has an error theory for the intuition elicited by the Kopeikin/Rachels’ cases. Kopeikin
and Rachels have an error theory for the intuition elicited by Hill’s cases. A natural thought is that we
are at an impasse. There is no plausible basis for preferring one error theory to the other. I argue that
this natural thought is mistaken. Not all error theories are equal. Preliminary considerations favor
Hill’s error theory and disfavor the Kopeikin/Rachels error theory. But preliminary considerations
are not decisive. The way forward in the bare-difference debate is not to evaluate intuitions. The
intuitions are in. What is left to do now is evaluate the comparative status of the Hill and the
Kopeikin/Rachels error theories.
Introduction
For debunking purposes, I do not think all error theories are equal. Some are better than others. One
thing an error theory can do is provide a defeater. Suppose there is some independent reason to think
an intuition is untrustworthy. Or suppose that there is some independent reason to think the belief
supported by an intuition is false. In such cases, support for the relevant belief is eroded. Let’s say
that an error theory is a defeating error theory for an intuition iff it provides a defeater for the belief that
that intuition supports.
An error theory can also make salient previously unrecognized possibilities. Suppose a belief
is supported by an intuition. Suppose a theory has the counterintuitive result that the relevant belief is
false. But suppose also that there is a story that would explain how the relevant belief could be false.
No defeater is provided. No independent reason is given for the truth of the error theory. But a
previously unrecognized possibility is made salient. Let’s say that an error theory is a mere just so story
for an intuition iff it identifies a possibility in which the belief  that that intuition supports is false.
A sufficiently strong defeating error theory warrants completely discounting the force of an
intuition. This is simply for the familiar reasons that a sufficiently strong defeater warrants
completely discounting the force of an intuition. A mere just so story, on the other hand, provides
little reason to discount an intuition. Consider my perceptual beliefs: I see a hand in front of me. On
the basis of what I see, I form the belief that there is a hand in front of me. But it is possible that I
am dreaming. That would explain my perceptual experiences. But it provides me with no reason to
discount the beliefs that are based on my perceptual experiences. I think that there are important
roles for mere just so stories in theory construction and evaluation. And I employ them myself
elsewhere. But for the purposes of debunking, my view is that a sufficiently strong defeating error
theory can do the job. But a mere just so story cannot.
In this paper, I argue Hill’s error theory is a defeating error theory and the Kopeikin/Rachels
error theory is a mere just so story. So as things stand, bare difference methodology supports the
view that killing is worse than letting die. Below, I assume familiarity with Kopeikin’s coin cases,
Rachels’ cases, and Hill’s cases. But for the reader unfamiliar with this literature, I include the relevant
cases in an Appendix for reference.
Hill’s Error Theory
In the coin cases, the differences between Smith’s act and Jones’ act are only due to a lucky difference
in the outcome of coin tosses. Our intuitions about cases involving moral luck are untrustworthy. So,
although I share Kopeikin’s intuition about the coin cases, I think that intuition should not be
trusted. In reply, Kopeikin (forthcoming a, p.) says: “the same challenge can be leveled against Hill’s
own cases.” And I think it is plausible that if we go back far enough, luck will explain why Jones has
one preference and Smith has another.
However, my view is that what leads our intuitions astray isn’t that moral luck can be found
somewhere eventually if we think about the case long enough. Instead, it is plausible that moral luck
is present in all cases. The issue isn’t whether it is objectively there. The issue is whether it is brought
to the forefront and highlighted. Think about Nagel’s drunk driver cases. When luck is left in the
background, we think the drunk driver that hits the curb and kills a family has done something worse
than the otherwise similar drunk driver that merely hits the curb. But when it is highlighted that the
only difference between their acts is the result of luck, our intuition is distorted and the acts seem the
same. Both drivers took the same risks, drove in exactly the same way, hit the exact same curb, and
drove on the exact same sidewalk. But one of the drivers was unlucky because there happened to be a
family on the sidewalk. Nagel points out that the natural reaction, after luck is highlighted is to think
there really is no difference between their acts.
Consider the ethicists that are the target of Hill’s earlier paper—Rachels (1986), Singer
(2005), Oddie (1997), and others. They will agree that there is a difference between the two drunk
drivers’ acts. For the relevant acts have different consequences. And though the differences in
consequences are due to luck, they are still morally relevant for the sort of ethicists that tend to be
sympathetic to Rachels’ argument. So even the main figures that think killing is no worse than letting
die should agree with that moral luck serves to make acts that are different seem equivalent. And it
isn’t the objective presence of moral luck that distorts our intuitions. It is taking moral luck out of the
background and making it especially salient that distorts our intuitions.
Now return to the coin cases. Constructing the cases in such a way that the difference
between acts is due entirely to the outcome of a coin toss puts moral luck front and center and makes
it maximally salient. Constructing the cases in such a way that the differences in acts are due to
differences in preferences, as in Hill’s examples, puts moral luck in the background. Our intuitions
are reliable when moral luck is in the background but unreliable when moral luck is salient. So we
should think our intuitions about Hill’s cases are more reliable than our intuitions about the coin
cases.
In light of this, Hill’s error theory is independently motivated. And it is an error theory that
the utilitarians that find Rachels cases compelling are forced to accept. So Hill’s error theory is a
defeat error theory.
There is a further point to consider. When moral luck is made salient, it doesn’t mislead our
intuitions in a random way. There is a specific way in which it is misleading. In particular, it mutes the
difference between acts. So to the extent to which moral luck is salient in Hill’s cases, we should think
that it is muting the difference between killing and letting die. My considered view, then, is this: Grant
for the sake of argument that moral luck is at least a little bit salient in Hill’s cases. We have the
intuition that killing is worse than letting die. Moral luck mutes the difference between acts. So the
presence of moral luck in Hill’s cases should make us think that we are underestimating the difference
between killing and letting die. On the other hand, moral luck is maximally salient in the coin cases.
And we lack the intuition that killing is worse than letting die in those cases. But that provides no
evidence for the view that killing is equivalent to letting die. For even if the relevant acts are different,
the maximal salience of moral luck would make it seem that they are the same. In the end, I think
that if we grant that moral luck is at least a bit salient in Hill’s cases, then that only shows that we
should be even more confident in the intuition that killing is worse than letting die. And I think that
is consistent with holding that moral luck should cause us to disregard our intuitions about the coin
cases.
Kopeikin (forthcoming a, p.) makes another relevant point in connection with moral luck:
“it’s not clear that the coin-flip does introduce moral luck. It strikes me that one would invoke moral
luck in my cases only if one antecedently thought killing is worse than letting die.” So even if I am
right that Hill’s error theory defeats intuitions generated by cases in which moral luck is salient, it
might be that the error theory is inapplicable to the coin cases.
I agree that moral luck is present in the coin cases only if there is a difference between killing
and letting die. But I think that is sufficient to support the use of Hill’s cases rather than the coin
cases. For whether or not killing is worse than letting die, the coin cases will give the same result. If
killing and letting die are equivalent, then there is no moral luck, and we’ll have the intuition that they
are equivalent. If killing is worse than letting die, then there is moral luck, and our intuitions will be
distorted in such a way that the acts seem equivalent. For this reason, it is not a helpful test. It is
insensitive to what we are testing for. Hill’s cases do not make moral luck salient. And so they are not
insensitive to whether killing is worse than letting die in the way that the coin cases are.
The Kopeikin/Rachels Error Theory
Smith prefers to kill. Jones prefers to let die. Hill thinks, and Kopeikin (forthcoming a, p.) grants for
the sake of argument, that Smith’s preference is worse than Jones’. Kopeikin rightly worries that Hill
might be confusing the comparative badness of Smith and Jones’ acts with the comparative badness
of their preferences. However, Hill has a natural explanation of why Smith’s preference is worse than
Jones’. It is that Smith prefers to perform an act—killing—that is worse than the act Jones prefers to
perform—letting die. The opponent of the view that killing is worse than letting die cannot offer this
explanation. And I don’t see what explanation they could give. So I don’t see that the fact that Smith’s
preference is worse provides a basis for thinking that Hill is confusing act with preference. We need
to explain why Smith’s preference is worse. And I don’t see how we can do that without supposing
that killing is worse than letting die.
Kopeikin’s (forthcoming a, p.) strategy is to deny the claim that Smith’s preference is worse
than Jones’. Here is where the Kopeikin/Rachels error theory comes in. As Kopeikin (forthcoming,
p.) puts it:
Rachels writes that we regularly hear from the media of horrible cases of killing, but rarely
hear of letting-die cases and that, when we do, they involve doctors ‘motivated by
humanitarian reasons’ [1975: 80]. Given this kind of exposure, one plausibly ‘learns to think
of killing in a much worse light than of letting die’ [ibid.]. I think that Rachels is correct, but
more needs to be said.
And then Kopeikin goes on to fill in the details about how this might work. This error theory
explains why we think killing is worse than letting die. And it is the misguided intuition that killing is
worse than letting die that makes us think Smith’s preference is worse. So an explanation for why
Smith’s preference is worse is no longer needed.
I think Kopeikin’s error theory is very interesting and worthy of further development.
However, I also think the Kopeikin/Rachels error theory, in its current stage of development, is not
sufficiently supported and is a mere just so story. It is possible that the media highlighting killing
rather than letting die explains why we think killing is worse. But it is also possible that the media
highlights killing rather than letting die because they know we think killing is far worse. And they
know highlighting the far worse thing will get attention and get clicks.
I have argued that the Hill error theory is a defeating error theory that is sufficiently strong
to completely undermine our intuitions in the coin cases and in Rachels’ original cases. In contrast,
the Kopeikin/Rachels error theory, as best as I can tell, just highlights a possibility. Kopeikin is in
good company. I think it is common for applied ethicists to appeal to mere just so stories. But I also
think that such stories, by themselves, provide little reason to discount our intuitions.
Character and Act
A common move in the literature on this topic is to hold that insofar as we have the intuition that
killing and letting die are different in a pair of cases, we are confusing character and act. As we have
seen, Kopeikin (forthcoming a) and (forthcoming b) makes this move. And he is in good company.
Kuhse (1998) and Perrett (1996) make this move too in especially important papers on this topic.
Suppose we agree with the widespread thought that it is tempting to confuse character and
act evaluation. If that is a possible worry about Hill’s cases, it is also a possible worry about the
Kopeikin/Rachels cases. In their cases, Jones and Smith have exactly the same desires and
dispositions to act. So their characters are the same. Just as differences in character might tempt us to
find differences in acts when those differences are not there, similarity in character might tempt us to
think that acts are morally similar when they are really different. So the allegation of confusing
character with act is a double-edged sword. Though most popularly wielded against the view that
killing is worse than letting die, it is at least as potent against the view that killing and letting die are
equivalent.
Furthermore, I have offered a response to the worry that Hill is confusing act with character.
Even if he is, the best explanation of why characters are different in Hill’s cases is that acts are
different in Hill’s cases. But that same explanation is not available to Kopeikin and Rachels.
This raises the question of whether there is something off about bare-difference
methodology in the first place. Bare difference cases are supposed to be ones in which everything is
the same across cases with the exception that one is a case of killing the other is a case of letting die.
But if everyone agrees that in all of the examples in the literature the characters are different, doesn’t
that imply that it is impossible to construct bare difference cases?
I don’t think that is quite right. I think this shows that Rachels’ original statement of what
bare difference cases are wasn’t refined enough. I think there are at least two ways of refining
Rachels’ account of bare difference cases that are worth considering and that do not have this
problem.
BDC1: Two cases are bare difference cases iff they are as similar as is consistent with one
being an act of  killing and the other being an actof  letting die.
BDC2: Two cases are bare difference cases iff (i) they are identical with the exception that one
is a case of killing and the other is a case of letting die and (ii) any other differences in the
cases are due to that one difference.
If I am right about what is going on in Hill’s cases, they are bare difference cases according to either
account just given. More work needs to be done to show that these can do the work that the original
account of bare difference cases is supposed to do. But this is a first pass at how to address the
relevant issue. Furthermore, if it turns out that it is impossible to construct bare-difference cases,
then I think that is a win for the proponent of the view that killing is worse than letting die. The
point of bare-difference methodology was originally to refute the view that killing is worse than
letting die. If  bare different cases cannot be constructed, then that refutation fails.
Violence
Hill’s cases differ with respect to violence. In one case there is an extra throat slitting. In the other
case there is not. Kopeikin (forthcoming a, p.) worries that this asymmetry might mislead our
intuitions. I think he is absolutely right to point that out. However, there are examples that elicit the
same intuition as Hill’s cases but do not differ with respect to violence. Consider Oddie’s Trolley:
“The conclusion of the argument has an obvious but possibly disturbing implication. A
runaway trolley with one passenger in it is careering out of control down a track towards the
left-hand fork further along which sits the stationary but this time empty trolley. A collision
will cause the death of the passenger on the moving trolley. The right-hand fork still leads to
the siding with the brick wall at the end of it. You could either do nothing, thereby letting
one person die, or you could send the trolley into the brick wall, thereby intervening to cause
his death. You could either let him die or you could kill him. According to equivalence, there
is no value-difference between the two.”
Oddie’s (1997, p. 273) example is better than Hill’s in the respect Kopeikin identifies. The two
alternatives—kill or let die—do not differ with respect to their degree of violence. Each is death by a
violent crash. Oddie defends the view that killing and letting die are equivalent. But he worries that
his example poses a problem for his view. And, as Hill (2018) discusses, Oddie attempts to “explain
away the recalcitrant intuition” that killing is worse in Oddie’s case. Moreover, consider a variant of
Hill’s examples that removes violence altogether:
Accident (Gentle Gas): Jones will gain a large inheritance if his six-year old cousin dies. Jones
decides to murder his cousin by releasing a gentle but deadly gas while the child is bathing.
But, as Jones begins to release the gas, he sees that an independently caused gas leak will kill
his cousin. Jones stands ready to release the gas if necessary. But the child dies as a result of
the independent leak. And Jones does nothing.
And
Accident + Murder (Gentle Gas): As before, Jones gets ready to release the gas and kill his
cousin and, before he does so, he notices an independent leak which, if nothing is done, will
kill his cousin. But Jones refuses to let his cousin die. He insists on patching up the leak
before it can do any harm and then releasing his own gas and killing the child himself.
It seems to me that if one agreed that killing is worse than letting die in Hill’s original cases, then one
should agree that killing is worse than letting die in the Gentle Gas variants of Hill’s cases. Both acts
are bad. But killing, in the Gentle Gas variants, is at least a bit worse.
Finally, let me a new pair of  examples:
Allowing: Over the course of four years you spend $3.4K on video games, fancy beer, dental
work, internet service, and books for your children by pressing buttons when you could have
pressed other buttons and spent that money to save a child’s life.
Doing: Over the course of four years you get $3.4K in video games, fancy beer, dental work,
internet service, and books for your children in exchange for pressing some buttons that
cause a child to die.
In each case you act by pressing buttons. But in one case you kill and in the other case you allow
death. It seems to me that the former is permissible and the latter is impermissible. There is no
difference with respect to violence in these cases as in Hill’s original cases. Moral luck is not made
salient as in the Kopeikin/Rachels cases. I do not think we should allow our intuitions about cases
like Allowing and Doing to be overturned by appeal to examples that highlight moral luck.
Objections and Replies
First Objection: In the drunk driver cases, there is a difference in consequences. In the coin cases, there
is no difference in consequences.
Reply: I don’t see how this asymmetry is a problem for my argument. Suppose the acts in a
par of cases differ due to moral luck. Then, recall, that my argument depends on the following
principle:
Luck Salience: As moral luck is made more and more salient, the acts seem more and more
equivalent.
And this is true whatever differences there are between the acts. If the consequences, character,
whatever are different, as moral luck is made more and more salient, the acts seem the same. If the
only difference is that one is a case of doing and the other is a case of allowing, then as moral luck is
made more and more salient, the acts seem more and more the same. And so, I claim, we can’t use
cases in which moral luck is made especially salient to test whether acts are morally different. For
whether they really are morally different or not, highlighting moral luck will flatten that difference
out. Making the difference between acts due to a coin flip makes the moral luck maximally salient and
so maximally flattens the seeming difference between the acts even if  they are different.
Second Objection: I (the objector) lack the intuition that the drunk driver cases are the same.
The acts seem different even after the fact that they are due to luck is made salient.
Reply: Fair enough. But there is a large body of literature developed around intuitions that
others have that making moral luck salient does mute the intuitive difference between two otherwise
different acts. And this is also present in discussions of the ethics of belief. Consider Clifford’s boat
examples. Two captains who suppress their doubts about the seaworthiness of their ships and send
their ships out. One is lucky and his ship sails safely. The other is unlucky and his ship sinks. Clifford
presses this point about luck into service of the claim that their acts of belief are equally bad. So
although some particular philosophers may lack the intuition that the drunk drivers or that Clifford’s
captains acts and beliefs are equivalent after moral luck is made salient, that does not remove the fact
that many philosophers report that their intuitions that the acts are different is substantially muted
and even eliminated in such cases. And if we agree that the relevant acts are actually different, or at
least that our intuitions in such cases jump back and forth between there being a difference and there
not being a difference, then we should be skeptical of examples that put moral luck so far at the
forefront as the coin examples do.
Third Objection: I (the objector) agree that the act in Accident + Murder (Gentle Gas) is worse
than the act in Accident (Gentle Gas). However, there is a problem with the killing variation of Hill’s
case. By taking the time and effort to patch up the leak so that he can kill his cousin, it seems as
though Jones is more motivated to be the hand by which his cousin dies than in the first case, where
he does nothing. And that is why the act in Accident + Murder (Gentle Gas) is worse.
Reply: Hill addresses a similar worry in reply to an objection concerning his original
examples. And I address a similar worry earlier in this paper. The core idea is this: Suppose being
more motivated to bring about the death of Jones’ cousin by one’s own hand makes the act of killing
worse than the act of letting die. Then we need an explanation of why this is worse. The proponent
of the view that killing is worse than letting die has such an explanation. In particular, being more
motivated to bring about death by one’s own hand is worse because killing is worse. If killing isn’t any
worse than letting die, then it is puzzling why the increased desire to kill would be worse. Compare:
There is no difference between killing in a green t-shirt and killing in a red t-shirt. And if I have the
choice to kill in either shirt but insist on the green shirt, that doesn’t make my act any worse.
Furthermore, there is no difference between effort spent in the two cases. In Accident (Gentle Gas),
Jones takes extra effort and time to patch up his own gas leak so that he isn’t the hand by which his
cousin dies. The difference between the cases is that in one Jones makes extra effort to avoid killing
his cousin and merely let him die. In the other case, Jones makes extra effort to be the hand by which
his cousin dies.
Furthermore, whatever complications may arise due to this factor in the Gentle Gas variants
of Hill’s original examples, no more effort is made in Allowing than Doing. But our intuition is that the
acts are different.
Fourth Objection: I claim that Luck Salience is true and that making moral luck salient distorts
our intuitions. I claim that it takes acts that are different and makes them seem the same. And it is
true, as an empirical matter, that making moral luck salient changes our intuitions. However, there is an
alternative moral hypothesis that accommodates the empirical data but does not entail that making
moral luck salient misleads us. Moral luck cases shift our focus from evaluations of act to evaluations
of character. Our initial intuitions about moral luck cases, such as the drunk driver cases, are that the
acts are different, but once the moral luck is made more salient, our intuitions shift to recognizing
that the character of the agents is equivalent (because, for example, both people took unacceptable
risks of  driving drunk) and this explains how moral luck affects our intuitions.
Reply: I do not think of this hypothesis as an alternative to Luck Salience. Rather, I think the
objector provides a more precise filling out of Luck Salience than what I offer above and a nice
explanation of why Luck Salience is true. And I think the objector’s point lends further support to my
claim that Hill’s examples are to be preferred in bare difference reasoning and the Kopeikin/Rachels
cases are to be avoided.
Remember, the objector’s idea here is that when moral luck is in the background, we are
eliciting intuitions about acts. And when moral luck is brought front and center, we are eliciting
intuitions about character. If the objector is right, then Kopeikin’s coin cases and Rachels’ bathtub
cases, since they put moral luck front and center, elicit intuitions about character. And for that
reason, if we want to know whether the act of killing is worse than the act of letting die, we shouldn’t
look to their cases since they elicit intuitions about character evaluation rather than act evaluation.
But Hill’s cases on the other hand, put moral luck in the background. And so, given the objector’s
hypothesis, they elicit intuitions about acts. Since we are evaluating acts and not character, it seems to
me that we should use Hill’s cases and not the Kopeikin/Rachels’ cases.
Appendix: Relevant Cases from the Bare-Difference Literature
Rachels’ Cases
Murder: Jones will gain a large inheritance if his six-year-old cousin dies. One evening, while
the child is taking a bath, Jones sneaks into the bathroom, drowns the child, and makes it
look like an accident.
Accident: As before, Jones sneaks into the bathroom planning to drown the child. But, as
Jones enters, the child hits his head and falls face down into the water. Jones stands ready to
kill the child if  necessary. But the child dies onhis own.
Hill’s Case
Accident + Murder: As before, Jones sneaks into the bathroom planning to drown
his cousin, and, as Jones enters, the child hits his head and falls face down in the
water. But Jones refuses to let his cousin die. Instead, Jones insists on killing him.
Kopeikin’s Cases
Heads-Indifference: Smith sneaks in and sees his cousin lying unconscious in the water
drowning. Smith stops. He is indifferent to whether or not his cousin dies by his own hand.
Smith removes a coin from his pocket and decides to flip it. If ‘heads’ is the result, he’ll
drown the cousin; if ‘tails’, he’ll let the cousin drown. The coin lands as ‘heads’. Smith shrugs
and proceeds with the outcome of the coin-flip. He gently holds down the unconscious child
until the child dies.
Tails-Indifference: Up to the coin-flip, everything proceeds in the same way for Jones. His coin
lands ‘tails’. He shrugs and proceeds with the outcome of the coin-flip: he stands by, ready to
gently hold down the unconscious child, but doesn’t need to do so. The child drowns as
Jones watches.
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